Home Blog

Betelgeuse Said “Ghost Rights!”: The Property Law of Haunted Houses

0

It’s Halloween, and you know what that means: haunted houses! In fiction and myth, ghosts are frequently depicted haunting a specific location — commonly either the deceased person’s former dwelling or the place where they died. But can disembodied spirits ever assert a property interest in the places they haunt? Can the haunted house belong to the ghost?

Although there is not much case law on point, at least one state court has contemplated the potential existence of a poltergeist and its legal repercussions. In Stambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.D.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that a homeowner who had publicly declared their house to be haunted was forbidden to change their story when they sold the house: “Whether the source of the spectral apparitions seen by defendant seller are parapsychic or psychogenic, having reported their presence in both a national publication (Readers’ Digest) and the local press (in 1977 and 1982, respectively), defendant is estopped to deny their existence and, as a matter of law, the house is haunted.” Stambovsky at 256.

So it is clear that a house can be legally haunted. But Stambovsky only addresses the responsibilities of a living owner. What about the possessory rights of the ghostly occupants in the houses that they haunt?

Case Study: Beetlejuice

Honey, I think we're dead. Alec Baldwin and Geena Davis as Adam and Barbara Maitland in BeetlejuiceThe 1988 film Beetlejuice provides a perfect example of ghosts who object to the presence of new occupants in a house which they had owned during their lives. Early in the movie, a young couple, Barbara and Adam Maitland, discover that they have died and are now stuck haunting their house as ghosts. To their dismay, the house is soon sold and a new family, the Deetzes, moves in.

For the purposes of this analysis, let’s assume that the Maitlands owned their home with no restrictions (no mortgages, no joint-tenants, etc.) and they died intestate (with no will and no heirs). Under the normal mechanisms of estate law, their property would escheat to the government when they died. Assuming that the ghosts of Barbara and Adam maintain the same legal personhood after the deaths of their bodies, would Barbara and Adam retain their possessory rights upon their death?

As a matter of legal fiction, yes. Without a will assigning future possessory interests to potential heirs, the Maitlands retained a fee simple absolute interest in their home. This interest is the strongest type of present possessory interest: it entails outright and full ownership of property, including land and all immovable attached structures, for an indefinite amount of time. Fee simple absolute interests do not end with the owner’s death – they simply get transferred (by sale, will, or gift) to a determined successor. This means, as a matter of pure legal fiction, the Maitlands can own their home indefinitely, since their interest in their home is indefinite. The subsequent sale of their home to the Deetz family, done without the Maitlands’ permission, would be rendered invalid.

In practice, no. If the home had not yet been gifted or sold, transfer of a property interest in fee simple absolute would take place upon the owner’s death. Unless the Maitlands can prove that their continued ghostly existence does not constitute “death” within the meaning of Connecticut state law, the escheat of their property interest to the government and the later conveyance of that interest to the Deetzes would be valid, thus making the Deetzes the new “true” owners of the house.

Honestly, wouldn't you want these people out of your house, too? Winona Ryder, Catherine O'Hara, and Jeffrey Jones in Beetlejuice

Spooky Squatters: Adverse Possession By Ghosts

Assuming that they lose their possessory interest in their house when they die, the Maitlands could regain it through adverse possession. Adverse possession law varies by state, so for the purposes of this case study we will apply the state law of Connecticut, which is where the Maitlands’ house is located.

Let's see what the law says... Barbara and Adam examine the Handbook for the Recently DeceasedIn Connecticut, the elements of adverse possession are actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous and exclusive possession for 15 years. See Mulle v. McCauley, 927 A.2d 921, 925 (Conn. App. 2007).

Many hauntings are actually very straightforward examples of adverse possession.

To prove actual possession, the ghost must demonstrate that their possession of the house is more than constructive. See Edward G. Mascolo, A Primer on Adverse Possession, 66 Conn. B.J. 303, 311 (1992). It is not enough to have once lived in the house during their lifetime. The ghost must be physically occupying the house to establish actual possession.

To prove open and notorious possession, the ghost must perform “open acts of ownership” (Mulle at 930) that “put a person of ordinary prudence on notice of the fact” that the ghost is claiming the land as their own. Mascolo at 311-12. By making weird noises, lowering the temperature of a room drastically, opening and slamming doors, and appearing visibly before the living occupants of the house, the ghost has effectively made the living aware of the ghost’s claim on the house.

To prove hostile possession, the ghost must show that at no point during the 15 year possession did the ghost have the permission of the living owner to haunt the house. Alternatively, if the ghosts and the living owners are strangers, possession may be considered hostile if the haunting is both open and notorious. See Woodhouse v. McKee, 879 A.2d 486 (Conn. App. 2005).

To prove continuous possession, the ghosts must continue to haunt the house, without prolonged breaks, for a full fifteen years. An exorcism counts as the forced eviction of the ghost, thereby resetting the clock on the ghost’s continuous possession.

To prove exclusive possession, the ghost must act as if it has final say over who can enter or stay in the house. These actions must be so open and public that the ghost’s control over the house is assumed. See, e.g., Mascolo at 309; Roche v. Town of Fairfield, 442 A.2d 911, 917 (Conn. 1982). A haunting may be considered exclusive if the ghosts are able to scare living occupants into abandoning the house in question.

Surely this will be scary enough! Barbara brandishes a severed head. Applying these elements to the plot of Beetlejuice, we find that the Maitlands face several hurdles to a successful adverse possession claim. Unfortunately for the Maitlands, they fall short of exercising “exclusive” possession over the house. On the one hand, hiring Beteljeuse to help them scare away the Deetzes is consistent with exclusivity: he is present with the Maitlands’ permission, and for the purpose of helping them enforce their control over who can be in the house. He’s kind of like a supernatural exterminator, or perhaps a guard dog. However, all of the ghosts’ hijinx continually fail to scare the Deetzes into abandonment. Moreover, because their deaths are so recent, the Maitlands have not been haunting their house long enough to satisfy the 15 year requirement. There remains the potential that they could fulfill this requirement over time, considering how they are tied to the house for 125 years, but the mere expectation that they will be present in the house for that length of time is not enough on its own to satisfy the “continuous” requirement. Most damningly, the eventual agreement between the Maitlands and Deetzes to share the house negates the element of exclusivity. Once the ghosts have been given permission to haunt the house, their adverse possession claim is even deader than they are.

In Conclusion…

Because literal death triggers the transfer of property, either to heirs or to the state, there appears to be no way for ghosts to directly maintain ownership over their houses—unless courts could be convinced to adopt an alternative definition of “death” as the being the end of one’s conscious existence, as opposed to the mere demise of one’s corporeal form. The law of adverse possession, however, provides a potential avenue for ghosts to claim (or reclaim) a possessory interest through haunting. In Beetlejuice, an out-of-court settlement proves to be a happy ending for all involved. But at least in theory, a ghost that successfully met all the elements of adverse possession could get the full rights to their house back—if they haunted the house long enough.

Works Cited

George Coppolo, Adverse Possession, Connecticut General Assembly Office of Legislative Research (Jan. 19, 2006), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-R-0032.htm.

Edward G. Mascolo, A Primer on Adverse Possession, 66 Conn. B.J. 303 (1992)

Mulle v. McCauley, 927 A.2d 921, 925 (Conn. App. 2007).

Roche v. Town of Fairfield, 442 A.2d 911, 917 (Conn. 1982)

Stambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.D.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)

Woodhouse v. McKee, 879 A.2d 486 (Conn. App. 2005).

About the authors

Gaby, Hannah, Andrew, and Alex are all second-year law students at NYU School of Law. Collectively known as “The Gaang,” the four of us bonded over rewatching/finally finishing Avatar: the Last Airbender during our first year of law school. As proud members of both the geek and legal communities, we’re thrilled to have the chance to contribute to this esteemed publication!


Gaby Schneider

Gaby Schneider is 2021 graduate of NYU School of Law. A lifelong nerd and proud "fangirl", she started writing for the Legal Geeks during her first year of law school. At NYU, she was best known for her double-triple-threat contributions to the Law Revue (actor/singer/dancer and writer/producer/techie). Her real life legal experience includes class action litigation at Bursor & Fisher, P.A., as well as internships at the Knight First Amendment Institute and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Originally from the Bay Area, she lives in San Francisco, where she can often be found indulging her boba tea addiction under the guise of a nice stroll around the neighborhood.


Hannah Umansky-Castro

Hannah Umansky-Castro is a second year law student at NYU Law who is passionate about immigration, equal protection, law of democracy and administrative law issues. She wrote a college thesis that compared Lord of the Rings to Don Quixote, analyzing the modern quest for meaning within the epic novel framework. She is a major fan of Percy Jackson, Avatar the Last Airbender, Doctor Who and Supernatural.


Andrew Soboeiro

Andrew Soboeiro is a third-year law student at NYU, as well as an aspiring immigration lawyer, Portuguese speaker, and barbecue enthusiast! Before law school, Andrew attended the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he wrote a thesis analyzing racial and ethnic stereotypes in Victorian English children's literature. He then taught English in Malaysia through the Fulbright Program. Andrew is a fan of Star Wars, Star Trek, Battlestar Galactica, Avatar/Korra, and The Good Place, to name just a few fandoms!


Alex Frey

Mr. Frey is a law student at NYU and connoisseur of popular culture.

Judging Spooky Ghosts

0

Judges have referenced Star Trek, Star Wars and classic science fiction in court opinions for years. However, Judges are not limited to being science fiction fans. Here are several opinions where Judges looked to the spirit world for spectral jurisprudence.

I just pray none are Team Edward or Team Jacob.

Halloween Ghost

Judging Intertextuality

Some Judges hauntingly command the English language:

Although a residential subdivision proposed for construction in a bucolic Rhode Island town never saw the light of day, its ghost continues to haunt the parties. But apparitions rarely have substance, and this one is no exception. After careful consideration of the plaintiff’s complaint and the district court’s order of dismissal, we lay the ghost to rest.

Marek v. State, 702 F.3d 650, 651 (1st Cir. R.I. 2012).

Discrediting a Witness

One spirit made a courtroom appearance as a admission why a witness opened a door….

Finally, in a move intended to cast doubt on Tackett’s credibility generally, the defense elicited an admission about Tackett’s initial reaction to the knock on her door at 3 a.m. Tackett confirmed a prior statement to police in which she reported that she first thought the ghost of a former occupant had made the knocking sound.

Browning v. Trammell, 717 F.3d 1092, 1098 (10th Cir. Okla. 2013).

SpookyHauntedHouseThe Ghost in the Case

Some judges really know how to make a point.

Haunted houses may be full of ghosts, goblins, and guillotines, but it’s their more prosaic features that pose the real danger. Tyler Hodges found that out when an evening shift working the ticket booth ended with him plummeting down an elevator shaft. But as these things go, this case no longer involves Mr. Hodges. Years ago he recovered from his injuries, received a settlement, and moved on. This lingering specter of a lawsuit concerns only two insurance companies and who must foot the bill. And at the end of it all, we find, there is no escape for either of them.

Western World Ins. Co. v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 1266, 1267 (10th Cir. Okla. 2012).

Ghosts of the Confederacy

Another reason why people fear jury duty: Is it wrong to tell a jury that there is the ghost of a Confederate soldier in the courthouse?

Next, Shuff argues that the district court erred in informing the jury pool during the voir dire proceeding about a legend that the ghost of a Confederate soldier haunted the courthouse. Although we ordinarily would review for abuse of discretion the manner in which the district court conducted the jury voir dire, United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir. 2004), because Shuff did not object to the court’s telling of the legend, we review this claim for plain error only. Robinson, 627 F.3d at 953-54.

After review of the record, we conclude that Shuff fails to establish any plain error that affected his substantial rights. During the voir dire proceeding, when counsel for Shuff and the Government were deciding whether to exercise any strikes against potential jurors, the district court gave a lengthy discourse in which it described the history of the courthouse and the land on which it was situated. As part of the narrative, the court mentioned that a building on the land had been seized by the Confederacy in 1861 and that there existed a legend that a “Confederate ghost” roamed the courthouse hallways. In Shuff’s view, it was error for the court to mention the legend because, in so doing, the court necessarily conveyed to the jury pool that “someone or something [was] watching and interested in the outcome” of the trial and that the “desired outcome [of the trial was] not the freedom of a black man.” Shuff, however, fails to point to anything in the record that would support these imaginative assertions. Further, after a review of the transcript of the jury voir dire, we are satisfied that no reasonable observer would conclude that there was even the appearance that Shuff’s race played a role in the proceeding. See United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156-57 (2nd Cir. 2007). This claim is therefore without merit.

United States v. Shuff, 470 Fed. Appx. 158 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012).

 

Ghostbusters & False Imprisonment

0

I ain’t afraid of no ghost, but how about false imprisonment?

The 1984 film Ghostbusters tells the story of private individuals who hunt, trap and “contain” ghosts haunting people.

However, could the Ghostbusters actually be falsely imprisoning formerly living people without any due process in violation of their “civil rights”?

Would there be any liability or the ability for surviving family members to recover on behalf of their deceased and imprisoned family members?

Under New York law, a “person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree when he restrains another person under circumstances which expose the latter to a risk of serious physical injury.” NY CLS Penal § 135.10.

Additionally, a “person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree when he restrains another person.” NY CLS Penal § 135.05.

By way of comparison, California requires the following to be proven for false imprisonment:

1. A person intentionally [and unlawfully] restrained, confined, or detained another person, compelling [him] [her] to stay or go somewhere;

2. The other person did not consent to the restraint, confinement, or detention; and

3. The restraint, confinement or detention was accomplished by violence or menace.

CALJIC 9.60.

What does this mean for the Ghostbusters?

Both states require a person be restrained in someway without that person’s consent.

The issue is simple:

Is a ghost a person subject to the protections of state and Federal law or a “former person” and thus not subject to being protected from false imprisonment?

Let’s review possible sources of what might give ghosts “personhood”:

The 14th Amendment, Section 1, to the United States Constitution, states:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

NY CLS Const Art I, § 11.

No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.

Does death end citizenship under the 14th Amendment, thus equal protection under the law, in our case specifically the prohibition of false imprisonment of living persons? Or does citizenship and the right to equal protection under the law begin at birth and continue for all eternity? Does the same apply to being a “person” under Article § 11 of the New York State Constitution?

There is no question the framers of the US Constitution, the 14th Amendment or the New York Constitution contemplated the law applying to undead individuals with rights similar to living persons. To be blunt, the dead do not come back to vote, buy property or renew their driver’s license.

With that said, our society does not embrace the idea of deceased citizens no longer being citizens. We have monuments for national heroes, honor those who have passed with folded flags and conduct burial ceremonies for those who have passed.

Death arguably does not end citizenship, however there is an interesting issue with the application of the 14th Amendment because of the text stating “…State wherein they reside.”  The word “reside” is defined “to live in a place.” Additionally, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “resident” as “a person who lives in a particular place.” Ghosts, by the very fact they are deceased, do not “live” anywhere, unless one counts where their bodies are buried as residences. That might work for voting in Chicago, but ask yourself, how much mail is delivered to tombstones? Moreover, haunting is fundamentally different than living, because 1) ghosts do not have any basic bodily functions showing life, such as requiring food or oxygen and 2) haunting involves tormenting the living.

This is not to say the dead are without any legal protections, as seen in wrongful death cases brought by a victim’s survivors. However, the spirit of the deceased victim did not retain counsel or file a lawsuit; the living family member brought the lawsuit. Moreover, the dead do not give testimony at a trial, unless it was recorded before death.

Nevertheless, there are laws that apply directly to the dead.

An entire body of law is dedicated to wills and trusts, which focus on the intent of the living for the distribution of their property and assets after their death.

Additionally, there are cases prohibiting the desecration of a corpse. Early New York cases have held living family members have the right to have the corpse of a family buried unmutilated from unauthorized autopsies. Foley v Phelps 1 App Div 551 [1896] and Darcy v Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y., 202 NY 259 [1911].

What do the cases of wills and corpse desecration show us? That there are strong arguments that the Ghostbusters are not violating the civil rights of the dead by imprisoning them.

The law is designed to protect the interests of the living. At best, laws prohibiting the desecration of a corpse are designed to bury the dead intact.

Given the above, it is unlikely there is any argument that trapping and containing ghosts could result in a case of false imprisonment. Moreover, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “person” as a “human being”; ghosts are no longer human beings. As such, it is a legal impossibility for the Ghostbusters to be falsely imprisoning a ghost (a former human being) under the law. Additionally, there is a strong argument that the Ghostbusters are acting in the defense of others from malcontent spirits and effectively acting as exterminators of life-threatening entities.

Property damage from crossing the streams on the other hand….

 

 

The Legal Geeks Interview Gabriel Diani on Ghosts, The Selling & Lawyer Movies

2

The Legal Geeks Jessica Mederson and Joshua Gilliland interview Gabe Diani (Josh’s brother) about The Selling, a movie about selling a haunted house.

The discussion includes stories from The Selling, a review of legal cases with ghosts (note, no part of this video should be considered legal advice on selling a haunted house), Gabe’s Kickerstarter project (along with Huck Finn, Robot Edition) and a pop quiz on lawyer movies.

The Ghosts of Real Property: A Discussion of The Selling

0

My younger brother Gabriel Diani wrote and starred in a film named The Selling. The premise of the film is that an honest real estate agent has to sell a haunted house to pay for his mother’s cancer treatment.

The film has won multiple awards at film festivals, including the Friars Club Comedy Film Festival, L.A. Comedy Film Festival, Idyllwild International Festival of Cinema, and the Tall Grass Film Festival. My brother recently launched a Kickstarter project for a limited release of the film.

As a big brother, I am very proud of the way Gabe racked up Best Actor awards like they were billable hours on document review.

The legal issues in The Selling included the disclosure of the multiple ghosts in the house (plus murders and demonic possession). The story involved an open house with bleeding walls and other issues that would significantly decease property value.

Let’s review the limited “body” of case law pertaining to haunted home sales in the United States.

They’re Here

When I first saw The Selling, I was instantly haunted by memories of Property in my first year of law school. The specific apparition was the strange case of Stambovsky v. Ackley. The case might be the only time is United States legal history where a Court actually stated, “…as a matter of law, the house is haunted.” Stambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.D.2d 254, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1991).

Stambovsky centered on a home buyer who brought an action for contract rescission because the seller did not disclose the house was haunted by poltergeists. Stambovsky, at *255-256. The seller’s family had “encountered” the spirits for nine years. Adding to the failed disclosure was that the fact that the haunted house had been featured in local and national publications, including a walking tour of haunted houses in the area.  Id.

The Plaintiffs lost at the trial level, based on the doctrine of caveat emptor. The appellate Court rejected caveat emptor under the facts of the case, because it conjured “up visions of a psychic or medium routinely accompanying the structural engineer and Terminix man on an inspection of every home subject to a contract of sale.” Stambovsky, at *257.

The Court held the following:

In the case at bar, defendant seller deliberately fostered the public belief that her home was possessed. Having undertaken to inform the public-at-large, to whom she has no legal relationship, about the supernatural occurrences on her property, she may be said to owe no less a duty to her contract vendee. It has been remarked that the occasional modern cases which permit a seller to take unfair advantage of a buyer’s ignorance so long as he is not actively misled are “singularly unappetizing” (Prosser, Torts § 106, at 696 [4th ed 1971]). Where, as here, the seller not only takes unfair advantage of the buyer’s ignorance but has created and perpetuated a condition about which he is unlikely to even inquire, enforcement of the contract (in whole or in part) is offensive to the court’s sense of equity. Application of the remedy of rescission, within the bounds of the narrow exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor set forth herein, is entirely appropriate to relieve the unwitting purchaser from the consequences of a most unnatural bargain.

Stambovsky, at *260.

I See Dead People

The 1914 case of De Souza v. Soares from Hawaii is part of the small body of US case law involving haunted houses and property sales.

From The Selling (Photo Courtesy of Gabriel Diani)

In De Souza, the Plaintiff claimed that when she sold her house to her brother-in-law, she executed the sale of her property based on the Defendant’s “misrepresentation that plaintiff’s house was haunted by ghosts and that she could not recover her health while living there.” De Souza v. Soares, 22 Haw. 17, 18-19 (Haw. 1914).

The Court sided with the Defendant in De Souza, finding that the Plaintiff was not credible, because she “was evasive and lacked in frankness.”  De Souza, at *19.

De Souza is a 98-year-old case from before Hawaii was even a state. However, there was no equitable relief as in Stambovsky, because it was not a seller who failed to disclose the “existence” of ghosts haunting the property, but a seller claiming she was tricked into selling because the buyer allegedly said house was haunted. In De Souza, the Defendant was more credible on the facts and the Plaintiff failed to show any fraud.

Grab Her?! That Was Your Plan?!

Barry Bostwick as Father Jimmy in The Selling (Photo Courtesy of Gabriel Diani).

There is very little “ghost law” in the United States, to the point where we cannot even say it is a body of law, but a spectre of cases. This is because of the unavailability of living witnesses, judicial resistance to seances in court and the entire question of proving beyond a preponderance of the evidence the existence an afterlife. It would also give new meaning to ghosting a hard drive.

With that said, we do have clear case law on disclosing a known defect in a house. If you have had TV coverage of ghosts reorganizing your closet or additional lifeless faces in mirrors besides your own, you may need both an old priest and a young priest at your open house.