Raiders of the Lost Ark asks the age old question: Can a bar fight with Nazi henchmen that causes the destruction of the bar result in partnership formation with the former bar owner?
What fiduciary duty is owed between partners on an adventure to find rare antiquities?
Partnership formation can happen without warning, like a giant bolder crashing down upon you.
Or darts shooting out of walls.
All the essential elements for a partnership needed under Connecticut law, home of Marshall College, is “the association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership. . . .” Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld, 50 Conn. App. 280, 287 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998), citing Conn. General Statutes § 34-314.
Let’s put on our fedoras and get out the bullwhips, because it is time to analyze the partnership issues in Raiders of the Lost Ark.
Throw Me The Idol & I’ll Breach My Fiduciary Duty
What fiduciary duty was owed by Satipo to Indiana at the Temple of the Chachapoyan Warriors?
Indiana Jones contracted with Satipo for assistance in finding the Chachapoyan Fertility Idol.
Satipo arguably was in a partnership with Jones because of the business venture from the History Museum to find the Idol.
As such, Satipo would have owed Jones the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. Conn. Sec. 34-338.
These duties include an accounting to the “partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct…” and avoid having adverse interests to the partnership. Conn. Sec. 34-338(b)(1) and (b)(2).
Satipo telling Jones to “throw me the Idol, I’ll throw you the whip” while they were trying to escape was a breach of his duty of loyalty to Jones. Moreover, Satipo not throwing over the whip was not only a breach of his duty, but an improper partnership dissolution, because he attempted to steal the Idol for himself (the same can be said for the former partner Barranca, who also breached his duty of loyalty by pulling a gun on Jones).
Alternatively, if there was not a partnership because Satipo was simply an independent contractor, he would have breached his contractual obligations by trying to demand the Idol for the whip for Indiana to escape.
You Still Remember How To Show A Lady A Good Time
Indiana Jones, an independent contractor for the US government, traveled to Nepal to purchase Headpiece to the Staff of Ra from Abner Ravenwood.
Jones negotiated with Marion Ravenwood for the Headpiece to the Staff of Ra for $3,000 cash, plus another $2,000 when they returned to the United States.
Marion kept the $3,000 cash.
After a Nazi thug bar fight resulting in the destruction of Marion’s bar and the $3,000 cash, Marion held up the Headpiece and said, “I am your goddamn partner!”
Would Indiana and Marion have a valid legal partnership?
Based on the statute and case law, yes.
You and I Are Merely Passing Through Partnership Formation…This, this IS Partnership Formation
A partnership is “the association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.” Conn. Sec. 34-314(a). Moreover, a “person who receives a share of the profits of a business is presumed to be a partner in the business…” Conn. Sec. 34-314(c)(3).
Marion’s participation in the partnership with Jones was for the fee of 1) $5,000 in exchange for, 2) the Headpiece to the Staff of Ra, so 3) Jones could find the Ark of the Covenant for the United States government in the Well of Souls.
The partnership would be a valid partnership, despite the lack of a written partnership agreement. As one Court explained:
A partnership is a contractual relation, which may be implied from conduct and circumstances alone. See 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 89. Connecticut General Statutes § 34-314(a) defines the formation of a partnership as follows: “the association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.” The elements of a partnership as expressed by the courts, generally include,an association of persons to combine property, money, effects, skill, and knowledge under a contract or agreement to carry out a lawful business enterprise for profit; co-ownership of the business enterprise; the conduct or contemplation of business activity; a community of interest in the business profits, management, and control; and the sharing of profits and losses from the business enterprise.
Balzer v. Millward, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43355, 8-9 (D. Conn. Apr. 21, 2011).
The Jones-Ravenwood partnership was the blending of Marion’s property and Jones’ skill to locate the Ark of the Covenant for the United States, with Marion getting $5,000 (which adjusted for inflation from 1936 would be $81,741.62 in 2012 for the bronze headpiece). All of this conduct demonstrated a valid partnership between the parties.
The Man is Nefarious
Marion Ravenwood was the legal owner of the Headpiece to the Staff of Ra. Marion’s father lawfully found it as a treasure trove, because King Shishak had been dead since approximately 979 or 978 BC, thus waiving any claim to the headpiece.
As such, would the Jones-Ravenwood partnership have a copyright claim against the Nazi Major Arnold Toht for unlawfully copying one side of the headpiece?
Possibly, but the issue is moot, because Toht melted from the wrath of God. Moreover, violating at least half of the 10 Commandments before opening the Ark of the Covenant would superseded any copyright claims.
The Adventures Continues
The legal adventures of Indiana Jones do not end there. Another time we will explore child endangerment in Temple of Doom, destruction of public property in Last Crusade and back child-support in Crystal Skull.
In the Man of Steel, Clark Kent goes to church and seeks out his minister for advice.
Would those communications be protected?
Could the pastor be forced to disclose those communications and that Clark Kent was Superman?
Most likely no, but there is a small chance the minister could disclose those communications, assuming the laws of the United States and Kansas applied to someone born on another planet.
The Kansas Rules of Evidence define the “Penitential Communication Privilege” as follows:
(a) Definitions. As used in this section,
(1) the term “duly ordained minister of religion” means a person who has been ordained, in accordance with the ceremonial ritual, or discipline of a church, religious sect, or organization established on the basis of a community of faith and belief, doctrines and practices of a religious character, to preach and to teach the doctrines of such church, sect, or organization and to administer the rites and ceremonies thereof in public worship, and who as his or her regular and customary vocation preaches and teaches the principles of religion and administers the ordinances of public worship as embodied in the creed or principles of such church, sect, or organization;
(2) the term “regular minister of religion” means one who as his or her customary vocation preaches and teaches the principles of religion of a church, a religious sect, or organization of which he or she is a member, without having been formally ordained as a minister of religion, and who is recognized by such church, sect, or organization as a regular minister;
(3) the term “regular or duly ordained minister of religion” does not include a person who irregularly or incidentally preaches and teaches the principles of religion of a church, religious sect, or organization and does not include any person who may have been duly ordained a minister in accordance with the ceremonial, rite, or discipline of a church, religious sect or organization, but who does not regularly, as a vocation, teach and preach the principles of religion and administer the ordinances of public worship as embodied in the creed or principles of his or her church, sect, or organization;
(4) “penitent” means a person who recognizes the existence and the authority of God and who seeks or receives from a regular or duly ordained minister of religion advice or assistance in determining or discharging his or her moral obligations, or in obtaining God’s mercy or forgiveness for past culpable conduct;
(5) “penitential communication” means any communication between a penitent and a regular or duly ordained minister of religion which the penitent intends shall be kept secret and confidential and which pertains to advice or assistance in determining or discharging the penitent’s moral obligations, or to obtaining God’s mercy or forgiveness for past culpable conduct.
(b) Privilege. A person, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing a communication if he or she claims the privilege and the judge finds that (1) the communication was a penitential communication and (2) the witness is the penitent or the minister, and (3) the claimant is the penitent, or the minister making the claim on behalf of an absent penitent.
K.S.A. § 60-429.
Clark went to church to for advice on what actions to take. For the privilege to apply, this would mean Clark was a “penitent” under the law, who recognizes the existence and the authority of God and who seeks or receives from a regular or duly ordained minister of religion advice or assistance in determining or discharging his or her moral obligation… K.S.A. § 60-429(a)(4).
This means Clark Kent, the boy from another world who grew up on a farm in Kansas, is a Christian.
The communications with the pastor, who appeared a duly ordained minster, was for guidance on what moral direction to take on whether to surrender to the US government and be turned over to General Zod.
This would meet Kansas’ “penitential communication” definition under K.S.A. § 60-429(a)(5).
Based on the above, Clark Kent’s visit to the church meets all of the elements under the Kansas Rules of Evidence for his communications to be privileged, because he sought moral advice from his minister.
Kansas case law holds that a party who made a privilege communication to a minister can have the privilege waived if the penitent tells the facts to third parties. State v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 458, 357 P.2d 739, 1960 Kan. LEXIS 436 (1960), writ of certiorari denied by 368 U.S. 868, 82 S. Ct. 80, 7 L. Ed. 2d 65, 1961 U.S. LEXIS 784 (1961).
This opens the door for the minster to disclose Clark’s penitential communications if Clark told others about the facts discussed with the minister about surrendering to General Zod. While Superman did turn himself over to the military, he did not disclose he was Clark Kent, nor the underlining content of his penitential communications. As for Lois Lane, she had already figured out Clark Kent had extraordinary powers, but did not discuss content of his seeking moral advice from his minister.
There is a chance the minister could disclose the content of Clark Kent’s penitential communications seeking moral advice on the technicality a Christian was not from Earth, but it is unlikely a Man of God would do that to the Man of Steel.
Unless you’re Stan Lee, working for Marvel seems like a frustrating gig. As I’ve written about before, Marvel has profited mightily from the blood, sweat, and tears of many a Marvel artist, thanks to the work-for-hire rule in copyright law. But Marvel’s standard work-for-hire defense may finally be vulnerable.
This issue has come up in Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc., a dispute over the Marvel character Ghost Rider. I never had much interest in the Ghost Rider character, and the movie with Nicholas Cage seemed pretty lame, but the few tastes of the comic I got from the opinion intrigued me. (The opinion even includes the cover of the first Ghost Rider comic book, which is pretty cool!)
Opinion at p. 5.
The character was introduced in 1972 – a motorcycle stunt driver who promised his soul to the devil, becoming a demon in exchange for saving his adoptive father from cancer. As the front page of the comic book acknowledges, Gary Friedrich, who brought this suit, conceived of this character and wrote the story. Stan Lee, of course, edited the story.
Friedrich filed suit a few years ago, claiming that he owns the renewal term copyright to Ghost Rider. The district court ruled against him, finding that Marvel owned the copyright because Friedrich had assigned his rights to the renewal term copyright when he executed a form work-for-hire agreement in 1978. Friedrich appealed this decision and the appellate court remanded the case for trial.
The appellate decision laid out the disputed facts, describing in part the inspiration for the Ghost Rider character. Although there’s a dispute as to how the character was developed, it seems clear that Stan Lee agreed to publish the comic book in exchange for Friedrich assigning his rights in the Ghost Rider characters to Marvel, although there was never any discussion of renewal rights and no written contract. The Ghost Rider character was very popular and Marvel ended up publishing over 300 Ghost Rider stories, including some as late as 2005.
Friedrich wrote many of the Ghost Riders stories on a freelance basis. In 1976, Congress changed the copyright law to provide, in part, that a work created outside the scope of employment could only be a “work-for-hire” if there was an express written agreement to that effect. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. When Friedrich was asked to sign such an agreement in 1978, he was supposedly told that the written agreement only covered future work and that he had to sign it if he wanted to continue working with Marvel. He was not paid for signing the agreement and, in fact, he was never hired to do any more work for Marvel.
The initial 28-year copyright term for Ghost Rider expired at the end of 2000. Normally, Friedrich, as the original author, would have held the right to the renewal copyright that began in 2001. See id. § 304(a)(1)(C)(i), (2)(B)(ii). Marvel continued to use the Ghost Rider character – a fact that Friedrich only became aware of in 2004 when he learned of the plans to make a movie on his character. Despite having his attorney assert his right to control the copyright, Marvel insisted they still owned the rights to the character under the work-for-hire law.
After filing suit, the district court found that the agreement Friedrich signed in 1978 included his assignment of all rights to both the original copyright term as well as the renewal term. That issue (along with two other related issues) is what was addressed on appeal.
The appellate court first explained the purposes of a renewal term (of 76 years), which is to “‘provide authors a second opportunity to obtain remuneration for their
works'” and “‘to renegotiate the terms of the grant once the value of
the work has been tested.'”
The court then looked to the contract to see if that intent had been clearly expressed. Interpreting the contract under New York state law (an issue I’ve discussed before in relation to Howard Stern’s contract dispute with Sirius), the appellate court found that it was not clear that Friedrich had assigned his renewal rights to Marvel under the 1978 agreement. This finding was based in part on the “strong presumption against the conveyance of renewal rights” under copyright law. The court then went on to find that the wording of the entire agreement was ambiguous and it was not clear whether it would have even covered a work created six years earlier. Nor was it clear that the agreement addressed renewal rights.
Because the contract language was ambiguous, the court looked to evidence outside of the terms of the agreement itself to see if the parties intended to address renewal rights in the agreement. Finding that there was a genuine dispute as to what the parties had intended (at the summary judgment stage there cannot be disagreements over facts key to resolving the legal dispute), the court sent the case back to the district court for trial.
There were two other related issues that were raised on appeal but both of those issues were also found to have factual disputes, so this decision by the appellate court didn’t resolve anything in either the plaintiff’s or defendants’ favor. But what it means is that, unlike so many of the other legal efforts made by Marvel comic book artists, Friedrich at least has a chance to take his case to a jury. It’s unlikely, of course, that the case will ever actually make it to trial – instead, the parties will probably settle based on the appellate court’s ruling.
It makes me happy, however, to know that at least one of the Marvel artists has a chance to get some proper compensation for his hard work and creativity!
A boy who grew up in abject poverty and became the President of the United States.
The man who went to the Republican Convention to nominate another man for President, only to get the nomination himself.
And stalked by an office seeker who murdered him.
President Garfield was one of the best men qualified for the office in US History. The country needed him, because the later half of the 19th Century is short on political heroes who stood on principle.
James Garfield was President for only 200 days.
Much of that time was spent dying.
The Destiny of the Republic
Candice Millard’s Destiny of the Republicis an amazing book on the life of President James Garfield.
Her analysis of Garfield’s rise to the Presidency and death from both an assassin’s bullet and his doctors is simply historical storytelling at its best.
Moreover, the accounting of Charles Guiteau’s trial is excellent, with a detailed summary of the insanity defense in the 19th Century.
After reading Destiny of the Republic, I reviewed the case law from Charles Guiteau trial and related legal issues.
Here are significant legal issues from Garfield’s assassination:
Presidential Succession
President Garfield’s death highlighted a huge gap in the Presidential Succession: There was no plan for who was in charge if the President was unable to fulfill his duties, but still alive. We have the 25th Amendment and Presidential Succession Act today, which explains how the Vice President can become the Acting President (or if the country is really having a bad day, the Speaker of the House on down to the Secretary of the Interior).
Garfield was shot on July 2, 1881. He did not die until September 19, 1881. That is a significant amount of time for “who exactly is in charge” for decisions that had to be made on matters of state.
Jurisdiction for A Presidential Assassin
President Garfield was shot in Washington, DC. He died in New Jersey. Justice Cox for the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia determined that the District of Columbia had jurisdiction to try Charles Guiteau for the President’s murder.
The Court held that DC was the proper venue, not where the President died as argued by Guiteau’s attorney Charles Reed, because “the crime was committed where the wound was inflicted.” United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey 498 (D.C. 1882). The Court explained:
The contention is, in this case, that murder can only be tried and punished in the county where it is committed; that death is an essential element in the crime, and that, as the death did not occur within this District, the crime of murder was not committed here, but, at most, an assault with intent to kill. The same reasoning will apply to the place where the death occurred. The mortal wound being an essential element of the crime, and this not having been inflicted in the same jurisdiction where the death occurred, it follows that murder was not committed there. The consequence of this doctrine is that, although murder most foul may be committed, yet, if by accident, or even by contrivance of the assassin himself, the victim be conveyed, before his death, over the territorial boundary of the jurisdiction where he was smitten, it becomes impossible to locate the murder, and its perpetrator secures immunity from the punishment due to this heinous crime.
///
A wound, not immediately fatal, is inflicted in this District. Until its consequences are ascertained, it cannot be determined whether the offense committed is a homicide or an attempt. But when death results from the wound, no matter where, it is ascertained that a homicide is committed. Everything of which the perpetrator was guilty was committed here. The crime consists in intentionally and unlawfully causing the death. Wherever the death may have occurred, it was caused here, by the fatal wound inflicted here. It is even a misnomer to speak of such an offense as having been begun here and completed elsewhere.
///
In this condition of affairs, I feel at liberty to adopt and announce the opinion which seems most to conform to common sense, and that is that the jurisdiction is complete where the fatal wound was inflicted.
United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey 563, 567-568, 584 (D.C. 1882).
Medical Malpractice
Charles Guiteau’s argued in his defense that Doctor Willard Bliss and the medical team killed President Garfield. Guiteau had a point, if you ignore the fact Bliss would have never treated Garfield but for Guiteau shooting the President. (See, Destiny of the Republic, Chapter 22).
Bliss did not believe in sterilizing medical equipment, explored Garfield’s wound without cleaning it and dominated the treatment of the President. This was also long before latex gloves and hand sanitizer.
Bliss was wrong. Arrogant. Ignorant. And he killed the President of the United States from his poor treatment.
Bliss’ arrogance was highlighted with his interaction with Alexander Graham Bell. Bell invented a medical metal detector specifically to find the bullet in the President. However, Bliss only let Bell scan the areas where Bliss thought the bullet was located.
Bliss’ treatment would make for an excellent civil case for medical malpractice, plus a possible criminal case for negligence. However, that would not be enough to give Guiteau a free pass for shooting James Garfield.
Bliss treated Garfield because Charles Guiteau planned to shoot President Garfield, purchased a gun for the purpose, practiced with said gun, stalked the President, and then shot Garfield in public with the intent to kill the President.
“But for” Guiteau’s actions, President Garfield would have never been under Bliss’ care for a gunshot wound.
A Fair Trial For a Very Public Crime
Jury Selection
Selecting an impartial jury for someone who murdered a President of the United States is no small task. It is a news story that is hard to miss.
Guiteau’s trial lasted from November 14, 1881 to January 25th, 1882. He was found guilty the same day. He was sentenced to be executed on June 30, 1882. United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey 498 (D.C. 1882).
How did the Court ensure Guiteau’s Constitutional right to a jury trial was fair? It’s not like they could simply move the trial to St. Thomas in the hopes of finding jurors who had not heard about Guiteau shooting Garfield (for the record, the United States did not purchase St. Thomas until 1917).
A 1893 opinion referenced the challenge of finding impartial jurors in both the Aaron Burr and Charles Guiteau trials. The Court explained:
The jury duty devolved upon the citizen is no more voluntary than his similar obligation to render military service. He can escape from neither upon the strength of his mere representation of his unfitness, and thus be allowed at his will to cast his obligation upon others, whose burden grows heavier by every such exemption. The duty of the examining authority, instead of ceasing when the citizen, in either case, has made his general claim to exemption, may more properly be said to have then really begun.
In the Burr trial, every one of the hundreds of persons summoned as jurors, with scarcely one exception, answered on his voir dire that he had formed an opinion. The attorneys for the United States could not have been far wrong when they expressed their belief that to obtain a jury in that case entirely free from all opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner was not possible, unless it should be dropped from Heaven, or be composed of hermits who had passed their lives immured in caves or hollow trees.
The same conditions appeared in the Guiteau trial.
But impartial jurors were finally obtained in each case, by a careful analysis by the court of the sources and extent of their alleged opinions. There must be few persons of intelligence in this country, who have not heard and participated in discussions as to the probabilities of the guilt of the person charged with the savage murder of her parents at Fall River a short time since; and atrocious crimes committed in even foreign countries, attract almost the same degree of attention here, and give rise to similar expressions of opinion, on the newspaper accounts of the facts or of coroners’ inquests. But as all sensible persons observe the reports vary in the different newspapers of the same day, and in successive issues of the same newspaper, it is impossible to believe such opinions can have a disqualifying effect upon the minds of men of average good sense. If this were so, the very lawyers who are employed to defend the accused and are on the alert to pronounce intelligent jurors disqualified, would find it their duty to decline service in a case they had thus necessarily prejudged.
Although the oath taken on the voir dire is to make true answers to such questions as may be asked by the court, the examination is often conducted in great part by counsel whose experience has taught them exactly what are the crucial points involved in the inquiry. Under such examinations, an ignorant person, appearing in court perhaps for the first time as a juror, with the limited vocabulary of the uneducated, may naturally assent to questions not fully understood; or by using technical terms in an inexact manner, may indicate the formation of disqualifying opinions; until a careful examination by the judge, the one person concerned in the inquiry who must be supposed to be entirely disinterested in any result except the attainment of justice to the prisoner and the community, may evince an impartiality fitting him to serve.
United States v. Barber, 1 Tuck. & Cl. 456, 462-464 (D.C. 1893) (Emphasis added).
Travel Costs for Witnesses
Getting across the United States costs money and takes time. Guiteau was broke. As such, the Defense made an application for the Court allowing fees for witnesses residing at a distance of more than one hundred miles from Washington testifying for the defense. United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey 585(May 22, 1882).
The application was made pursuant to section No. 839 of the Revised Statutes of the District, which stated, “In all criminal trials the Supreme Court, or the judge trying the case, may allow such number of witnesses on behalf of the defendant as may appear necessary, the fees thereof, with the costs of service, to be paid in the same manner as Government witnesses are paid.” Id.
The Court decided in chambers how many witnesses were to testify for the defense at the expense of the Government. US v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey 585(May 22, 1882).
The Insanity Defense
Guiteau plead to the Court that he was not guilty by reason of insanity, because God told him to kill President Garfield. Moreover, he was no longer insane because God was not talking to him (See, Destiny of the Republic, Chapter 22 for a beautifully detailed account of the trial).
And so began a very long trial on whether or not Charles Guiteau was insane that included 36 expert witnesses. Guiteau himself testified for two weeks.
The Court issued the following jury instruction on the insanity defense:
“If he is laboring under disease of his mental faculties–if that is a proper expression–to such an extent that he does not know what he is doing, or does not know that it is wrong, then he is wanting in that sound memory and discretion which makes a part of the definition of murder.”
US v Guiteau, 1 Mackey 498, at *550.
Justice James of the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia explained the insanity defense as follows:
Insanity is a defense on the very ground that it disables the accused from knowing that his act is wrong. The very essence of the inquiry is whether his insanity is such as to deprive him of that knowledge. If a witness is competent to give his opinion as to the mental condition of the accused, he is competent to state his opinion as to the degree of capacity, or of incapacity, by reason of disorder, and whether the disorder seemed to have reached such a degree as to deprive him of the knowledge of right and wrong. That capacity or incapacity is itself a question as to the extent of the disorder, if disorder exists, and is not a conclusion to be drawn from the existence of insanity.
US v Guiteau, 1 Mackey 498, at *546.
The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia found the witnesses who testified on the issue of sanity were competent to do so and thus no error in their testimony. Id.
Dr. Fordyce Barker was a Prosecution witness who answered the following question on direct examination:
“Is the habit of boasting of intimacy with people holding high position, and possessing influence and power, when the fact is otherwise, any evidence, in your judgment, as a scientist, of an insane delusion?”
Answer:
“It is not an evidence of a delusion of an insane person, because it is not the result of disease. It is a result of vanity and self-conceit and love of notoriety. These are vices and not diseases.”
US v Guiteau, 1 Mackey 498, at *546.
The Court explained the testimony was admissible, because the issue of shooting the President had been conceded by the Defendant. The doctor’s answer spoke only to the issue of sanity or insanity and not of guilt. Id.
Guiteau’s ex-wife also testified that she saw no evidence of Guiteau being of unsound mind. The ex-wife had been instructed by the court not to disclose any communications between husband and wife, which are protected. As she was only testifying to her opinion, not any communications, her testimony was admissible. US v Guiteau, 1 Mackey 498, at *547-549.
Scholars on the Rules of Evidence may still question this testimony, because the ex-wife’s opinions were based on marital communications. Apparently, the NSA is not the first to argue the “context over content” argument in court.
Other witnesses testified to fraudulent activity of Guiteau from the early and mid-1870s, after the Defense had introduced evidence of “insanity” that spanned Guiteau’s entire life. Guiteau had even testified on these events.
The Court held the rebuttal “sanity” evidence was admissible:
In this body of defensive evidence his moral nature and traits had been presented, as a means of showing that acts done by him must be accounted for by a conclusion of insanity. It was competent to show, in rebuttal, that the grounds on which this inference of insanity was based, did not exist, and to do this by exhibiting particular acts and conduct of the defendant, contemporaneous with the history produced on his part, which tended to disprove the existence of those grounds. If a conclusion might be drawn from his moral nature that his acts must be insane, it was relevant and proper to show that his real moral nature was one which did not call for such an explanation.
After comparing the evidence, as to particular acts, offered on both sides, we are of opinion that the evidence in rebuttal was responsive to the evidence in defense, and was admissible. It must be remembered that the killing of the deceased was admitted; the implication of malice had already been made when the prosecution rested their case. The issue now was whether the defendant was responsible for that act by reason of insanity. The application of his improper acts was limited, therefore, to that issue. For these reasons we find no error in the admission of the facts referred to, and for the same reasons we find none in that part of the charge to the jury which related to this point.
US v Guiteau, 1 Mackey 498, at *549.
The Insanity Defense has never been popular with the public. Cases frequently are tried in the press before they are tried in a courtroom. This causes public outcry when press driven results are not reached by the jury. However, it is rare for the public to actually listen to an entire trial, watch each witness or understand the jury instructions. As one Court stated, “As to the reasonableness of a defense being mounted in this case, we need look no farther than the “Twinkie” defense asserted in the Moscone-Milk murder case for an example of what may appear reasonable to a jury.” People v. Burns, 184 Cal. App. 3d 203 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1985)
The Insanity Defense had a substantial amount of scorn from the Prosecution in the trial of Sirhan Sirhan for the murder of Robert Kennedy. The closing argument by World War II hero and later California Court of Appeals Justice Lynn Compton stated to the jury that if they didn’t buy the psychiatric testimony, “then there’s nothing left but plain old cold-blooded first-degree murder.”
Despite the hostility toward the Insanity Defense, Courts have described the Insanity Defense over the years with effectively the same intent:
[The] insanity defense, which is to save from criminal conviction one who lacks responsibility for his unlawful acts, has not been achieved on this record by the introduction of sufficient evidence to make that defense a substantial issue in the determination of appellant’s guilt or innocence.
United States v. Collins, 433 F.2d 550, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The California Jury Instructions state the following on the determining whether a Defendant is legally insane:
The defendant was legally insane if:
1. When (he/she) committed the crime[s], (he/she) had a mental disease or defect;
AND
2. Because of that disease or defect, (he/she) was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of (his/her) act or was incapable of knowing or understanding that (his/her) act was morally or legally wrong.
None of the following qualify as a mental disease or defect for purposes of an insanity defense: personality disorder, adjustment disorder, seizure disorder, or an abnormality of personality or character made apparent only by a series of criminal or antisocial acts.
2-3400 CALCRIM 3450.
No one wants to see the guilty go free. No one wants to see the innocent convicted of a crime they were not responsible for committing. This is what makes the Insanity Defense a challenge, because rational human beings should not engage in the unlawful killing of another human being. When someone is murdered, we as a society want justice. Many have viewed the Insanity Defense as a way of escaping justice, when its intent is to ensure that those convicted of a crime actually had the criminal intent to do so.
Charles Guiteau may have had several sever personality disorders and delusions of grandeur. Was he insane? Some expects thought yes and some no. In the case of the jury, they saw a man who deliberately planned to murder President James Garfield.
Would the same result be reached today? I think so because of the substantial premeditated planning, target practice and stalking by Guiteau to kill President Garfield. Guiteau knew his actions would result in the death of James Garfield.
With that said, there would be substantial arguments over whether Guiteau had a disease that diminished his capacity to know right from wrong. Expert witnesses would argue that a personality disorder with imagined self-importance is not a disease under the law. However, it is hard to predict if Guiteau would have been tried like Sirhan Sirhan or not have been competent to stand trial like John Hinckley.
Guiteau & Defamation
History views Presidential assassins with a high degree of scorn.
In 1887, a Plaintiff sued over the Defendant calling him a “crank.” Since Garfield’s assassination, the word “crank” had obtained a meaning referring to Guiteau that meant a “crack-brained and murderously inclined person” from the media. Walker v. Tribune Co., 29 F. 827, 829 (C.C.D. Ill. 1887).
The Court granted a demur for the Defendant, citing Ogilvie’s Imperial Dictionary (1885 publication), which defined “crank” as “Some strange action, caused by a twist of judgment; a caprice; a whim; a crotchet; a vagary. Violent of temper; subject to sudden cranks. Carlyle.” Id.
What Garfield Means to the United States
President Garfield is in second place for the shortest Presidency in US History. Garfield was one of the few successful Presidential dark horse candidates to get nominated by his party, joining the likes of James K Polk.
Why is he relevant today?
James Garfield represented everything honorable about the American Experience. The poor child with a brilliant mind. The young man who went to college and swept the floors, only to ultimately become president of the school. The daring Civil War General who knew the value of human life. The good husband and father.
America will always need people like James Garfield. A good man who did not seek higher office, but was sought out for it. We need the heroes who are willing to do the hard work to make our country better. That is why we should remember James Garfield.
We thank the judges who scored our podcast and appreciate the recognition for our fireside legal analysis of Star Wars and Super Heroes with Judge Matthew Sciarrino.
We will be back in 2014 in the Podcast and Website Categories.
Buffy and Alias and Veronica Mars – the holy trinity of bad ass shows. I love them all and have wished multiple times that there was some way I could bring them back. And now, thanks to Kickstarter, I can take a little bit of credit for bringing Veronica Mars back to life!
The show made Kickstarter history recently with its campaign to raise funds for a Veronica Mars movie. I couldn’t resist the idea – or the trailer – so I had to contribute to the effort. Just a little – there’s no red carpets, voicemail messages, or back rubs in my future – but it’s still very exciting to get Rob Thomas’s updates and know that I’ll get a few VM goodies at some point.
But, as a lawyer, I have to wonder…what happens if the movie doesn’t get made or if I don’t get my promised goodies. Kickstarter describes itself as “a funding platform for creative projects.” Since it launched in 2009, more than 3 million people have pledged over $500 million to fund more than 35,000 projects. Kickstarter says it doesn’t guarantee any of the projects – it’s the project creator’s responsibility to complete their projects. Kickstarter also says that it’s the creator’s job to ensure that the promised rewards are delivered to the backers (like me!).
So now I’m looking at you, Rob Thomas. What happens if you don’t make the movie or if you don’t deliver my goodies? What rights do I have? Well, after NPR did a story on this issue – what rights do the backers of failed projects have – Kickstarter changed its policy. Now, if a project is successfully funded, the creators are required to either fulfill the rewards or refund the backers. As a result, the backers have a right as a third-party beneficiary of the contractual agreement between Kickstarter and the creators to demand their money or their rewards.
Meanwhile, crowdfunding as a means of raising capital is also facing a host of possible regulations by the SEC – although what and how those laws will be implemented is still questionable.
So I should be able to ensure that Rob Thomas continues emailing me…and sends me a copy of the movie DVD. And, before I go, I’ve got to give a shout out to Legal Geeks’ friend (and brother of one half of The Legal Geeks), Gabe Diani, who had his own successful Kickstarter project: The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn: Robotic Edition. It looks like a ton of fun!
Raiders of the Lost Ark asks the age old question: Can a bar fight with Nazi henchmen that causes the destruction of the bar result in partnership formation with the former bar owner?
What fiduciary duty was owed by Satipo to Indiana at the Temple of the Chachapoyan Warriors?
Indiana Jones, an independent contractor for the US government, traveled to Nepal to purchase Headpiece to the Staff of Ra from Abner Ravenwood.
The partnership would be a valid partnership, despite the lack of a written partnership agreement. As one Court explained:
