Josh and Jessica interview Madeleine Holly-Rosing, author of the Boston Metaphysical Society.
All men are created equal.
Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776
One of my motivations for becoming an attorney was my love of country.
Celebrating our Declaration of Independence on the 4th of July has always been very important to me (Just as is Constitution Day).
Not because of memories of my grandfather making homemade ice cream by hand, fireworks in front of our house or marching in the local parade as a youth.
Those things made up my American Experience.
My love of the 4th of July is heavily fueled by my love of history. From the events of 1763 to the Declaration of Independence; from to the Federalist Papers to the United States Constitution and ultimately the Bill of Rights, essentially define American life in the United States. The story of how all came about have been the subject of many books, each with great leaders who will be remembered as long as we have a country.
Nature throws us all into the world equal and alike…the only maxim of a free government ought to be to trust no man [kings included] to endanger public liberty.
John Adams, from his notes on an oration at Braintree, quoted in John Adams, by David McCullough, page 121.
On Being a History Geek
I took enough upper division history classes at UC Davis for a mini major in United States history. Our history has many heroes who did the hard work to build a free nation. They literally put their lives on the line for a free nation to be born.
Do you recollect the pensive and awful silence which pervaded the house when we were called up, one after another, to the table of the President of the Congress to subscribe what was believed by many at that time to be our own death warrants?
Benjamin Rush, letter to John Adams, 1781, The Essential Wisdom of the Founding Fathers, edited by Carol Kelly-Gangi
We value our freedom from government intervention with our lives. Perhaps the most overlooked evidence of this national value is the Third Amendment to the US Constitution. Few people EVER hear mention of this Amendment, but it expressly forbids the quartering of soldiers in private homes. The Third Amendment expressly states:
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
The United States simply has not quartered soldiers in private homes because of our Revolutionary experience from the British soldiers being unwanted house guests. There is barely any case law of the Third Amendment, simply because the US Army has not forced soldiers into the homes of citizens to be fed and housed. We don’t do that here.
The Third Amendment highlights one of our fundamental beliefs in country: to be free of an oppressive police state. This is paramount for anyone to have “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” Moreover, the Third Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights creating a “penumbra of privacy” as cited in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (U.S. 1965).
The Third Amendment might be one of the forgotten amendments, but it certainly demonstrates our values of a free society.
On Service to Country
Every post is honorable in which a man can serve his country.
George Washington, Letter to Benedict Arnold, September 14, 1775, The Essential Wisdom of the Founding Fathers, edited by Carol Kelly-Gangi
Our country is free because of those willing to defend it.
I have many friends who serve in the military. I know many who serve the public trust as district attorneys, public defenders, county counsel and judges. To everyone who took an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, thank you.
…and Third Amendment notwithstanding, there are very few Americans who would not be proud to invite someone serving in the military over to join in a 4th of July celebration.
I love John Carter, as is well-documented. I’m also fascinated with inside Hollywood stories, so I had to read John Carter and the Gods of Hollywood. This book by a Hollywood filmmaker examines why this movie did so poorly at the box office.
As I discussed last year, I was pleasantly surprised by the movie when I finally watched it. In fact, after seeing it, I was disappointed that it had been written off as such a disaster. And that meant we probably won’t be getting any sequels. So, given all that, I had to read Michael Sellers’ book just to find out what the heck happened to my beloved John Carter!
The book starts off with some great background on Burroughs himself, along with Hollywood’s interest in his other creation, Tarzan. Then it goes into the early efforts to put John Carter on the big screen. While Tarzan worked well on film, trying to replicate Barsoom and its inhabitants wasn’t feasible for most of the 20th Century (although there was some early talk of doing an animated film).
Robert Rodriguez and Jon Favreau were both attached to direct a John Carter movie when Paramount had the film rights a decade ago, which they had purchased from the family company started in 1923 to protect Burroughs’ creations, Edgar Rice Burroughs Inc. (“ERB”). Nothing ever came of these efforts, however, and the rights reverted to ERB. But then Andrew Stanton, of Finding Nemo fame, talked Disney into acquiring the rights and letting him direct the $250 million epic.
Fast forward to the marketing for the movie. Sellers spends much of his book detailing Disney’s failed efforts – and, more importantly, its general lack of effort – to market the movie. At times, his book reads like a textbook on social marketing. He also details his attempts, through his website, www.thejohncarterfiles.com, to make up for Disney’s feeble marketing. He and a friend made a fan trailer that was better than the official trailers. They even highlighted the fact that everyone from George Lucas to James Cameron has poached Edgar Rice Burroughs’ legacy with a great slogan: The epic tale that inspired 100 years of filmmaking.
Throughout the book runs a theme of hopefulness – the author keeps thinking that he or Disney will do something to turn around the impending disaster, although we all know nothing worked (which makes the constant dreams of a turnaround in the book a bit annoying). The book even ends with one last wish – that the fans could join together and inspire a sequel.
I’d love a sequel but I don’t hold out much hope that it will happen after what Disney did to the first John Carter movie – a travesty Sellers documents well in his book. My only complaints about his book have to do with the editing – there were too many typos and the book was far too long. He could have cut out much of the detail on the social media front, along with multiple pages he included of cut and paste comments from online sources, without hurting his story.
On the legal side, it’s interesting to see that ERB is still effectively using the law to protect John Carter. Having been written over a hundred years ago, A Princess of Mars is in the public domain. That’s because, under U.S. copyright law, any works published before 1923 are now in the public domain. Generally, works published now are protected for 70 years after the death of the author, although there are exceptions. So Burroughs’ early works are now in the public domain, while the rest of his works are only protected through 2020 (seventy years after his death in 1950). This only applies to the US, however. In other countries, such as Great Britain, ERB still has copyright protection for all of Burroughs’ stories.
But because its US copyright protection is rapidly eroding, ERB is now turning to trademark law to protect its marks – John Carter and Tarzan primary among them – in order to keep profiting from Burroughs’ genius. Last year it filed suit against a comic book distributor, alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition – not copyright infringement. If only ERB could have sued Disney for bungling the marketing of the John Carter movie!
Let’s be clear about one thing: my brother Gabe Diani is in Research, so this is a mild tale of nepotism.
Each episode of Research could provide law professors hours of exam questions for law students. It should give Employment Lawyers nightmares that result in them carrying whiskey flasks to client meetings. Uncontrollable laughter is also foreseeable.
Let’s review the highlights of the main legal issues presented in the first two episodes.
Episode 1: The Pilot
Episode 2: Secretariat
Let’s Poison a Test Subject
Taking a room full of test subjects and telling them one might drink poison raises many legal issues. The obvious is murder, because a poison is being used to kill a person (California Penal Code section 189). This demonstrates malice aforethought to kill a test subject and clearly is first degree murder, regardless of whether or not a specific test subject is the target of the poison.
There would also be significant issues of intention inflection of emotional distress by telling test subjects that there is a poison in one of the test cups. While there would need to be waivers of liability to participate in any research study, one cannot willfully try to torture people. There is simply no waiver of liability for torture.
Taylor’s Sexual Harassment of Dave
An attractive woman randomly kissing a supervisor might be common on late night cable, but it is sexual harassment in the real world. To prove sexual harassment, Dave would must demonstrate the following:
1. That Dave had a business, service, or professional relationship with Taylor; and
2. That Taylor made sexual advances to Dave.
Alternatively, Dave could prove under California law that:
1. Taylor engaged in verbal, visual, and physical conduct of a sexual nature;
2. Taylor’s conduct was unwelcome and also pervasive or severe;
3. Dave was unable to easily end the relationship with Taylor; and
4. That Dave has suffered or will suffer the violation of a statutory or constitutional right as a result of Taylor’s conduct.
5-30 California Forms of Jury Instruction 3065.
Contrary to Taylor saying it was not sexual harassment when a “woman does it,” Taylor could be found to have sexually harassed Dave, because the law is not limited on which gender can sexually harass the other. (The law even provides protection against same gender harassment, See Singleton v. United States Gypsum Co., 140 Cal. App. 4th 1547, 1548 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2006)).
There was uninvited kissing and verbal comments. Moreover, Taylor waiting in the conference room boarders on stalking Dave. All of these facts would show a repeated pattern of harassment of Dave or at a minimum stalking.
Job Posting on JDate
Research also raises issues of religious discrimination by posting a job ad on JDate, showing a preference for Jewish employees at the expense of qualified non-Jewish candidates (not to mention a high degree of cultural insensitivity). The California Constitution specifically prohibits disqualifying a person from employment based upon their religion. Cal Const, Art. I § 8.
There is an exception to the above, because a religious employer has discretion to select employees who will not interfere with their religious mission. Silo v. CHW Med. Found. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1097, 1108-1109 applying U.S. Const., Amend. I; Cal. Const., art. I, § 4 to Cal. Const., art. I, § 8. As the team on Research has nothing to do with a religious mission, this hiring practice could result in a lawsuit.
Physical Battery by Dr. Rust
Dr. Rust slapped Dave across the face. There is also facial touching of both receptionists.
Battery under California Penal Code section 242 is “is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.” Dr. Rust slapping Dave would unquestionably be battery, resulting in civil and criminal liability. It is also a terminable offense from employment.
The touching of both receptionists’ faces would be unlawful touching as well. While not the same physical force as a slap, it is extremely creepy behavior that could result in a lawsuit.
This says nothing of giving Kate face melting acid.
Who Handled the Blood Sample?
Performing blood draws and the storing of blood is a heavily regulated profession. (See, Cal Bus & Prof Code § 1242 and Cal Health & Saf Code § 7150.10). The team at Research could not simply leave a large bottle of blood out in the open brought in by a test subject.
Sexual Discrimination in Hiring
Grant’s mandate for Dave to hire a “hot chick” would be several forms of sexual discrimination. First, it eliminates all qualified men who applied for the position. Second, it discriminates against women based solely on appearance, whether or not they are skilled to do the job. Third, it invites unlawful future sexual harassment of the new hire. The mandate is a lawsuit waiting to happen.
There Are Even More Issues
Research is a law professor’s dream on possible legal issues. These are only the first two episodes and just the tip of the iceberg on possible liability for the fictional company.
Marion Ravenwood
Raiders of the Lost Ark asks the age old question: Can a bar fight with Nazi henchmen that causes the destruction of the bar result in partnership formation with the former bar owner?
What fiduciary duty is owed between partners on an adventure to find rare antiquities?
Partnership formation can happen without warning, like a giant bolder crashing down upon you.
Or darts shooting out of walls.
All the essential elements for a partnership needed under Connecticut law, home of Marshall College, is “the association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership. . . .” Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld, 50 Conn. App. 280, 287 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998), citing Conn. General Statutes § 34-314.
Let’s put on our fedoras and get out the bullwhips, because it is time to analyze the partnership issues in Raiders of the Lost Ark.
Throw Me The Idol & I’ll Breach My Fiduciary Duty
What fiduciary duty was owed by Satipo to Indiana at the Temple of the Chachapoyan Warriors?
Indiana Jones contracted with Satipo for assistance in finding the Chachapoyan Fertility Idol.
Satipo arguably was in a partnership with Jones because of the business venture from the History Museum to find the Idol.
As such, Satipo would have owed Jones the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. Conn. Sec. 34-338.
These duties include an accounting to the “partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct…” and avoid having adverse interests to the partnership. Conn. Sec. 34-338(b)(1) and (b)(2).
Satipo telling Jones to “throw me the Idol, I’ll throw you the whip” while they were trying to escape was a breach of his duty of loyalty to Jones. Moreover, Satipo not throwing over the whip was not only a breach of his duty, but an improper partnership dissolution, because he attempted to steal the Idol for himself (the same can be said for the former partner Barranca, who also breached his duty of loyalty by pulling a gun on Jones).
Alternatively, if there was not a partnership because Satipo was simply an independent contractor, he would have breached his contractual obligations by trying to demand the Idol for the whip for Indiana to escape.
You Still Remember How To Show A Lady A Good Time
Indiana Jones, an independent contractor for the US government, traveled to Nepal to purchase Headpiece to the Staff of Ra from Abner Ravenwood.
Jones negotiated with Marion Ravenwood for the Headpiece to the Staff of Ra for $3,000 cash, plus another $2,000 when they returned to the United States.
Marion kept the $3,000 cash.
After a Nazi thug bar fight resulting in the destruction of Marion’s bar and the $3,000 cash, Marion held up the Headpiece and said, “I am your goddamn partner!”
Would Indiana and Marion have a valid legal partnership?
Based on the statute and case law, yes.
You and I Are Merely Passing Through Partnership Formation…This, this IS Partnership Formation
A partnership is “the association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.” Conn. Sec. 34-314(a). Moreover, a “person who receives a share of the profits of a business is presumed to be a partner in the business…” Conn. Sec. 34-314(c)(3).
Marion’s participation in the partnership with Jones was for the fee of 1) $5,000 in exchange for, 2) the Headpiece to the Staff of Ra, so 3) Jones could find the Ark of the Covenant for the United States government in the Well of Souls.
The partnership would be a valid partnership, despite the lack of a written partnership agreement. As one Court explained:
A partnership is a contractual relation, which may be implied from conduct and circumstances alone. See 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 89. Connecticut General Statutes § 34-314(a) defines the formation of a partnership as follows: “the association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.” The elements of a partnership as expressed by the courts, generally include,an association of persons to combine property, money, effects, skill, and knowledge under a contract or agreement to carry out a lawful business enterprise for profit; co-ownership of the business enterprise; the conduct or contemplation of business activity; a community of interest in the business profits, management, and control; and the sharing of profits and losses from the business enterprise.
Balzer v. Millward, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43355, 8-9 (D. Conn. Apr. 21, 2011).
The Jones-Ravenwood partnership was the blending of Marion’s property and Jones’ skill to locate the Ark of the Covenant for the United States, with Marion getting $5,000 (which adjusted for inflation from 1936 would be $81,741.62 in 2012 for the bronze headpiece). All of this conduct demonstrated a valid partnership between the parties.
The Man is Nefarious
Marion Ravenwood was the legal owner of the Headpiece to the Staff of Ra. Marion’s father lawfully found it as a treasure trove, because King Shishak had been dead since approximately 979 or 978 BC, thus waiving any claim to the headpiece.
As such, would the Jones-Ravenwood partnership have a copyright claim against the Nazi Major Arnold Toht for unlawfully copying one side of the headpiece?
Possibly, but the issue is moot, because Toht melted from the wrath of God. Moreover, violating at least half of the 10 Commandments before opening the Ark of the Covenant would superseded any copyright claims.
The Adventures Continues
The legal adventures of Indiana Jones do not end there. Another time we will explore child endangerment in Temple of Doom, destruction of public property in Last Crusade and back child-support in Crystal Skull.
In the Man of Steel, Clark Kent goes to church and seeks out his minister for advice.
Would those communications be protected?
Could the pastor be forced to disclose those communications and that Clark Kent was Superman?
Most likely no, but there is a small chance the minister could disclose those communications, assuming the laws of the United States and Kansas applied to someone born on another planet.
The Kansas Rules of Evidence define the “Penitential Communication Privilege” as follows:
(a) Definitions. As used in this section,
(1) the term “duly ordained minister of religion” means a person who has been ordained, in accordance with the ceremonial ritual, or discipline of a church, religious sect, or organization established on the basis of a community of faith and belief, doctrines and practices of a religious character, to preach and to teach the doctrines of such church, sect, or organization and to administer the rites and ceremonies thereof in public worship, and who as his or her regular and customary vocation preaches and teaches the principles of religion and administers the ordinances of public worship as embodied in the creed or principles of such church, sect, or organization;
(2) the term “regular minister of religion” means one who as his or her customary vocation preaches and teaches the principles of religion of a church, a religious sect, or organization of which he or she is a member, without having been formally ordained as a minister of religion, and who is recognized by such church, sect, or organization as a regular minister;
(3) the term “regular or duly ordained minister of religion” does not include a person who irregularly or incidentally preaches and teaches the principles of religion of a church, religious sect, or organization and does not include any person who may have been duly ordained a minister in accordance with the ceremonial, rite, or discipline of a church, religious sect or organization, but who does not regularly, as a vocation, teach and preach the principles of religion and administer the ordinances of public worship as embodied in the creed or principles of his or her church, sect, or organization;
(4) “penitent” means a person who recognizes the existence and the authority of God and who seeks or receives from a regular or duly ordained minister of religion advice or assistance in determining or discharging his or her moral obligations, or in obtaining God’s mercy or forgiveness for past culpable conduct;
(5) “penitential communication” means any communication between a penitent and a regular or duly ordained minister of religion which the penitent intends shall be kept secret and confidential and which pertains to advice or assistance in determining or discharging the penitent’s moral obligations, or to obtaining God’s mercy or forgiveness for past culpable conduct.
(b) Privilege. A person, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing a communication if he or she claims the privilege and the judge finds that (1) the communication was a penitential communication and (2) the witness is the penitent or the minister, and (3) the claimant is the penitent, or the minister making the claim on behalf of an absent penitent.
K.S.A. § 60-429.
Clark went to church to for advice on what actions to take. For the privilege to apply, this would mean Clark was a “penitent” under the law, who recognizes the existence and the authority of God and who seeks or receives from a regular or duly ordained minister of religion advice or assistance in determining or discharging his or her moral obligation… K.S.A. § 60-429(a)(4).
This means Clark Kent, the boy from another world who grew up on a farm in Kansas, is a Christian.
The communications with the pastor, who appeared a duly ordained minster, was for guidance on what moral direction to take on whether to surrender to the US government and be turned over to General Zod.
This would meet Kansas’ “penitential communication” definition under K.S.A. § 60-429(a)(5).
Based on the above, Clark Kent’s visit to the church meets all of the elements under the Kansas Rules of Evidence for his communications to be privileged, because he sought moral advice from his minister.
Kansas case law holds that a party who made a privilege communication to a minister can have the privilege waived if the penitent tells the facts to third parties. State v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 458, 357 P.2d 739, 1960 Kan. LEXIS 436 (1960), writ of certiorari denied by 368 U.S. 868, 82 S. Ct. 80, 7 L. Ed. 2d 65, 1961 U.S. LEXIS 784 (1961).
This opens the door for the minster to disclose Clark’s penitential communications if Clark told others about the facts discussed with the minister about surrendering to General Zod. While Superman did turn himself over to the military, he did not disclose he was Clark Kent, nor the underlining content of his penitential communications. As for Lois Lane, she had already figured out Clark Kent had extraordinary powers, but did not discuss content of his seeking moral advice from his minister.
There is a chance the minister could disclose the content of Clark Kent’s penitential communications seeking moral advice on the technicality a Christian was not from Earth, but it is unlikely a Man of God would do that to the Man of Steel.
Unless you’re Stan Lee, working for Marvel seems like a frustrating gig. As I’ve written about before, Marvel has profited mightily from the blood, sweat, and tears of many a Marvel artist, thanks to the work-for-hire rule in copyright law. But Marvel’s standard work-for-hire defense may finally be vulnerable.
This issue has come up in Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc., a dispute over the Marvel character Ghost Rider. I never had much interest in the Ghost Rider character, and the movie with Nicholas Cage seemed pretty lame, but the few tastes of the comic I got from the opinion intrigued me. (The opinion even includes the cover of the first Ghost Rider comic book, which is pretty cool!)
The character was introduced in 1972 – a motorcycle stunt driver who promised his soul to the devil, becoming a demon in exchange for saving his adoptive father from cancer. As the front page of the comic book acknowledges, Gary Friedrich, who brought this suit, conceived of this character and wrote the story. Stan Lee, of course, edited the story.
Friedrich filed suit a few years ago, claiming that he owns the renewal term copyright to Ghost Rider. The district court ruled against him, finding that Marvel owned the copyright because Friedrich had assigned his rights to the renewal term copyright when he executed a form work-for-hire agreement in 1978. Friedrich appealed this decision and the appellate court remanded the case for trial.
The appellate decision laid out the disputed facts, describing in part the inspiration for the Ghost Rider character. Although there’s a dispute as to how the character was developed, it seems clear that Stan Lee agreed to publish the comic book in exchange for Friedrich assigning his rights in the Ghost Rider characters to Marvel, although there was never any discussion of renewal rights and no written contract. The Ghost Rider character was very popular and Marvel ended up publishing over 300 Ghost Rider stories, including some as late as 2005.
Friedrich wrote many of the Ghost Riders stories on a freelance basis. In 1976, Congress changed the copyright law to provide, in part, that a work created outside the scope of employment could only be a “work-for-hire” if there was an express written agreement to that effect. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. When Friedrich was asked to sign such an agreement in 1978, he was supposedly told that the written agreement only covered future work and that he had to sign it if he wanted to continue working with Marvel. He was not paid for signing the agreement and, in fact, he was never hired to do any more work for Marvel.
The initial 28-year copyright term for Ghost Rider expired at the end of 2000. Normally, Friedrich, as the original author, would have held the right to the renewal copyright that began in 2001. See id. § 304(a)(1)(C)(i), (2)(B)(ii). Marvel continued to use the Ghost Rider character – a fact that Friedrich only became aware of in 2004 when he learned of the plans to make a movie on his character. Despite having his attorney assert his right to control the copyright, Marvel insisted they still owned the rights to the character under the work-for-hire law.
After filing suit, the district court found that the agreement Friedrich signed in 1978 included his assignment of all rights to both the original copyright term as well as the renewal term. That issue (along with two other related issues) is what was addressed on appeal.
The appellate court first explained the purposes of a renewal term (of 76 years), which is to “‘provide authors a second opportunity to obtain remuneration for their
works'” and “‘to renegotiate the terms of the grant once the value of
the work has been tested.'”
The court then looked to the contract to see if that intent had been clearly expressed. Interpreting the contract under New York state law (an issue I’ve discussed before in relation to Howard Stern’s contract dispute with Sirius), the appellate court found that it was not clear that Friedrich had assigned his renewal rights to Marvel under the 1978 agreement. This finding was based in part on the “strong presumption against the conveyance of renewal rights” under copyright law. The court then went on to find that the wording of the entire agreement was ambiguous and it was not clear whether it would have even covered a work created six years earlier. Nor was it clear that the agreement addressed renewal rights.
Because the contract language was ambiguous, the court looked to evidence outside of the terms of the agreement itself to see if the parties intended to address renewal rights in the agreement. Finding that there was a genuine dispute as to what the parties had intended (at the summary judgment stage there cannot be disagreements over facts key to resolving the legal dispute), the court sent the case back to the district court for trial.
There were two other related issues that were raised on appeal but both of those issues were also found to have factual disputes, so this decision by the appellate court didn’t resolve anything in either the plaintiff’s or defendants’ favor. But what it means is that, unlike so many of the other legal efforts made by Marvel comic book artists, Friedrich at least has a chance to take his case to a jury. It’s unlikely, of course, that the case will ever actually make it to trial – instead, the parties will probably settle based on the appellate court’s ruling.
It makes me happy, however, to know that at least one of the Marvel artists has a chance to get some proper compensation for his hard work and creativity!