It’s Halloween, and you know what that means: haunted houses! In fiction and myth, ghosts are frequently depicted haunting a specific location — commonly either the deceased person’s former dwelling or the place where they died. But can disembodied spirits ever assert a property interest in the places they haunt? Can the haunted house belong to the ghost?
Although there is not much case law on point, at least one state court has contemplated the potential existence of a poltergeist and its legal repercussions. In Stambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.D.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that a homeowner who had publicly declared their house to be haunted was forbidden to change their story when they sold the house: “Whether the source of the spectral apparitions seen by defendant seller are parapsychic or psychogenic, having reported their presence in both a national publication (Readers’ Digest) and the local press (in 1977 and 1982, respectively), defendant is estopped to deny their existence and, as a matter of law, the house is haunted.” Stambovsky at 256.
So it is clear that a house can be legally haunted. But Stambovsky only addresses the responsibilities of a living owner. What about the possessory rights of the ghostly occupants in the houses that they haunt?
Case Study: Beetlejuice
The 1988 film Beetlejuice provides a perfect example of ghosts who object to the presence of new occupants in a house which they had owned during their lives. Early in the movie, a young couple, Barbara and Adam Maitland, discover that they have died and are now stuck haunting their house as ghosts. To their dismay, the house is soon sold and a new family, the Deetzes, moves in.
For the purposes of this analysis, let’s assume that the Maitlands owned their home with no restrictions (no mortgages, no joint-tenants, etc.) and they died intestate (with no will and no heirs). Under the normal mechanisms of estate law, their property would escheat to the government when they died. Assuming that the ghosts of Barbara and Adam maintain the same legal personhood after the deaths of their bodies, would Barbara and Adam retain their possessory rights upon their death?
As a matter of legal fiction, yes. Without a will assigning future possessory interests to potential heirs, the Maitlands retained a fee simple absolute interest in their home. This interest is the strongest type of present possessory interest: it entails outright and full ownership of property, including land and all immovable attached structures, for an indefinite amount of time. Fee simple absolute interests do not end with the owner’s death – they simply get transferred (by sale, will, or gift) to a determined successor. This means, as a matter of pure legal fiction, the Maitlands can own their home indefinitely, since their interest in their home is indefinite. The subsequent sale of their home to the Deetz family, done without the Maitlands’ permission, would be rendered invalid.
In practice, no. If the home had not yet been gifted or sold, transfer of a property interest in fee simple absolute would take place upon the owner’s death. Unless the Maitlands can prove that their continued ghostly existence does not constitute “death” within the meaning of Connecticut state law, the escheat of their property interest to the government and the later conveyance of that interest to the Deetzes would be valid, thus making the Deetzes the new “true” owners of the house.
Spooky Squatters: Adverse Possession By Ghosts
Assuming that they lose their possessory interest in their house when they die, the Maitlands could regain it through adverse possession. Adverse possession law varies by state, so for the purposes of this case study we will apply the state law of Connecticut, which is where the Maitlands’ house is located.
In Connecticut, the elements of adverse possession are actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous and exclusive possession for 15 years. See Mulle v. McCauley, 927 A.2d 921, 925 (Conn. App. 2007).
Many hauntings are actually very straightforward examples of adverse possession.
To prove actual possession, the ghost must demonstrate that their possession of the house is more than constructive. See Edward G. Mascolo, A Primer on Adverse Possession, 66 Conn. B.J. 303, 311 (1992). It is not enough to have once lived in the house during their lifetime. The ghost must be physically occupying the house to establish actual possession.
To prove open and notorious possession, the ghost must perform “open acts of ownership” (Mulle at 930) that “put a person of ordinary prudence on notice of the fact” that the ghost is claiming the land as their own. Mascolo at 311-12. By making weird noises, lowering the temperature of a room drastically, opening and slamming doors, and appearing visibly before the living occupants of the house, the ghost has effectively made the living aware of the ghost’s claim on the house.
To prove hostile possession, the ghost must show that at no point during the 15 year possession did the ghost have the permission of the living owner to haunt the house. Alternatively, if the ghosts and the living owners are strangers, possession may be considered hostile if the haunting is both open and notorious. See Woodhouse v. McKee, 879 A.2d 486 (Conn. App. 2005).
To prove continuous possession, the ghosts must continue to haunt the house, without prolonged breaks, for a full fifteen years. An exorcism counts as the forced eviction of the ghost, thereby resetting the clock on the ghost’s continuous possession.
To prove exclusive possession, the ghost must act as if it has final say over who can enter or stay in the house. These actions must be so open and public that the ghost’s control over the house is assumed. See, e.g., Mascolo at 309; Roche v. Town of Fairfield, 442 A.2d 911, 917 (Conn. 1982). A haunting may be considered exclusive if the ghosts are able to scare living occupants into abandoning the house in question.
Applying these elements to the plot of Beetlejuice, we find that the Maitlands face several hurdles to a successful adverse possession claim. Unfortunately for the Maitlands, they fall short of exercising “exclusive” possession over the house. On the one hand, hiring Beteljeuse to help them scare away the Deetzes is consistent with exclusivity: he is present with the Maitlands’ permission, and for the purpose of helping them enforce their control over who can be in the house. He’s kind of like a supernatural exterminator, or perhaps a guard dog. However, all of the ghosts’ hijinx continually fail to scare the Deetzes into abandonment. Moreover, because their deaths are so recent, the Maitlands have not been haunting their house long enough to satisfy the 15 year requirement. There remains the potential that they could fulfill this requirement over time, considering how they are tied to the house for 125 years, but the mere expectation that they will be present in the house for that length of time is not enough on its own to satisfy the “continuous” requirement. Most damningly, the eventual agreement between the Maitlands and Deetzes to share the house negates the element of exclusivity. Once the ghosts have been given permission to haunt the house, their adverse possession claim is even deader than they are.
In Conclusion…
Because literal death triggers the transfer of property, either to heirs or to the state, there appears to be no way for ghosts to directly maintain ownership over their houses—unless courts could be convinced to adopt an alternative definition of “death” as the being the end of one’s conscious existence, as opposed to the mere demise of one’s corporeal form. The law of adverse possession, however, provides a potential avenue for ghosts to claim (or reclaim) a possessory interest through haunting. In Beetlejuice, an out-of-court settlement proves to be a happy ending for all involved. But at least in theory, a ghost that successfully met all the elements of adverse possession could get the full rights to their house back—if they haunted the house long enough.
Works Cited
George Coppolo, Adverse Possession, Connecticut General Assembly Office of Legislative Research (Jan. 19, 2006), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-R-0032.htm.
Edward G. Mascolo, A Primer on Adverse Possession, 66 Conn. B.J. 303 (1992)
Mulle v. McCauley, 927 A.2d 921, 925 (Conn. App. 2007).
Roche v. Town of Fairfield, 442 A.2d 911, 917 (Conn. 1982)
Stambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.D.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
Woodhouse v. McKee, 879 A.2d 486 (Conn. App. 2005).
About the authors
Gaby, Hannah, Andrew, and Alex are all second-year law students at NYU School of Law. Collectively known as “The Gaang,” the four of us bonded over rewatching/finally finishing Avatar: the Last Airbender during our first year of law school. As proud members of both the geek and legal communities, we’re thrilled to have the chance to contribute to this esteemed publication!
Gaby Schneider
Gaby Schneider is 2021 graduate of NYU School of Law. A lifelong nerd and proud "fangirl", she started writing for the Legal Geeks during her first year of law school. At NYU, she was best known for her double-triple-threat contributions to the Law Revue (actor/singer/dancer and writer/producer/techie). Her real life legal experience includes class action litigation at Bursor & Fisher, P.A., as well as internships at the Knight First Amendment Institute and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Originally from the Bay Area, she lives in San Francisco, where she can often be found indulging her boba tea addiction under the guise of a nice stroll around the neighborhood.
Hannah Umansky-Castro
Hannah Umansky-Castro is a second year law student at NYU Law who is passionate about immigration, equal protection, law of democracy and administrative law issues. She wrote a college thesis that compared Lord of the Rings to Don Quixote, analyzing the modern quest for meaning within the epic novel framework. She is a major fan of Percy Jackson, Avatar the Last Airbender, Doctor Who and Supernatural.
Andrew Soboeiro
Andrew Soboeiro is a third-year law student at NYU, as well as an aspiring immigration lawyer, Portuguese speaker, and barbecue enthusiast! Before law school, Andrew attended the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he wrote a thesis analyzing racial and ethnic stereotypes in Victorian English children's literature. He then taught English in Malaysia through the Fulbright Program. Andrew is a fan of Star Wars, Star Trek, Battlestar Galactica, Avatar/Korra, and The Good Place, to name just a few fandoms!
Alex Frey
Mr. Frey is a law student at NYU and connoisseur of popular culture.
